Job Creation for Union Members through Pension Fund Investment by Wessel, Paul J.
Buffalo Law Review 
Volume 35 Number 1 Article 9 
1-1-1986 
Job Creation for Union Members through Pension Fund 
Investment 
Paul J. Wessel 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview 
 Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Paul J. Wessel, Job Creation for Union Members through Pension Fund Investment, 35 Buff. L. Rev. 323 
(1986). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol35/iss1/9 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at 
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital 
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
Job Creation for Union Members Through
Pension Fund Investment
Table of Contents
I. INTRODUCTION ................................. 324
II. PENSION FUND STRUCTURES AND THE REALITY OF CON-
TROL ...................................... 328
A. Employer-Administered vs. Jointly Administered
Plans .................................. 329
B. Structure and Control in Construction Industry
Plans .................................. 331
III. THE LAW OF PENSIONS AND PENSION INVESTING ..... 332
A. Pre-ERISA .............................. 332
B. ERISA ................................. 334
C. ERISA Fiduciary Standards ................. 335
IV. JOB-CREATING INVESTMENTS UNDER ERISA FIDUCIARY
STANDARDS .................................... 337
A. Prohibited Transactions Rule ................ 338
B. Prudence Rule ........................... 339
C. The Duty of Loyalty ....................... 341
V. BROCK V. WALTON-UNION INVESTMENT AFFIRMED .. 347
A. The District Court Decision .................. 347
B. The Decision Analyzed ............. ........ 351
VI. THE "UNION-LABOR" ISSUE ....................... 353
A. The Parties to the Issue and Their Positions ..... 353
1. Construction Unions .................... 354
2. Participants and Beneficiaries ........... 354
3. Employers ........................... .355
4. Department of Labor ................. 356
B. Possible Legal Resolutions of the "Union-Labor" Is-
sue ................................... 358
VII. CONCLUSION ................................... 362
323
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
A merican labor unions have begun to use their members' pen-
sion fund assets to make business investments that create
union jobs. The legality of these investments is not completely
certain. Questions concerning the fiduciary duty of union pension
fund trustees are being raised when such investments, which often
are not the most financially attractive available on the market, are
made. A reinterpretation of pension trustee fiduciary responsibil-
ity is necessary to permit union pension fund trustees to continue
making job-creating investments.
In the late 1970's, organized labor in the United States began
to protest that the huge sums of money being held in retirement
pension funds for union members were not being handled in a
manner favorable to labor. Unions looked with disgust at the in-
vestment of their pension assets in foreign and domestic non-
union competition in industry, at the abuse of pension assets by
corporate managers for business and personal profit, and at the
overall failure of pension fund trustees to keep fund growth at a
rate comparable to the inflation rate. The way the unions saw it,
their own pension funds were being used to finance the loss of
their members' jobs and retirement income security.'
Labor's appreciation of this situation led to a renewal of in-
terest in efforts to gain a greater degree of control over the man-
agement of pension fund assets.2 Prompted in part by the publica-
tion in 1978 of Rifkin and Barber's seminal work on union
pensions and the potential for pension control in The North Shall
Rise Again,3 unions became interested not only in correcting the
abuses of pension funds, but also in utilizing them as an instru-
ment to revitalize a struggling labor movement through pension
asset investment to create union jobs. As AFL-CIO president
Lane Kirkland stated in 1979:
Pension funds have been used by some banks and investment counselors to
1. See AMERICAN FED'N OF LAB.-CONG. OF INDUS. ORG., INVESTMENT OF UNION PENSION
FUNDS 22-30 (1980) [hereinafter AFL-CIO].
2. Greater control of pension assets was originally supported by labor in the 1950's.
See generally P. HARBRECHT, ECONOMIC POWER OF PENSION FUNDS (1959); R. TILOVE, PENSION
FUNDS AND ECONOMIC POWER (1959) (both promoting ethical investing strategies and stock
shareholder activism for union pension funds).
3. J. RIFKIN & R. BARBER, THE NORTH SHALL RISE AGAIN: PENSIONS, POLITCS AND POWER
IN THE 1980s (1978).
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finance runaway employers to the injury of the very unions and workers who
negotiated and created those funds. That has to stop. We shall be pursuing
every available means to insure that pension money is invested creatively and
constructively to the benefit of workers and fair employers.
4
In 1980, the AFL-CIO released its first-ever study on union
strategies for pension investment control.5 It estimated that of the
$860 billion in total private and public sector pension funds in
1979, $212 billion was held in trust for union members.' Unions
realized that if they could successfully manage these vast assets in
financial markets themselves, it would have a significant impact on
the economy in ways favorable to workers.
The promise that increased control and use of pension funds
held for labor in the late 1970's remains largely unfulfilled, how-
ever. Certain strategies that exploit the power of pension assets
are being implemented by unions, but none on the scale originally
hoped for by the captains of labor.' One such strategy is the use
of coordinated capital investment boycott campaigns against anti-
union industries. 9 Another is the exercise of shareholder voting
rights held by pension funds to pass union supported resolutions
at corporate shareholder meetings.10 Still another is the use of
4. H. GRAY, NEW DIRE-rIONS IN PENSION FUNDS 42 (1983).
5. Recommendations of the Committee on Investment of Union Pension Funds to AFL-CIO
Executive Council on New Pension Fund Investment Initiatives. PENs. REP. (BNA) No. 305, at R-
16 - 17 (Aug. 25, 1980).
6. Id. Estimates of assets held in collectively bargained pension funds vary. The De-
partment of Labor does not require that pension plans disclose whether or not they are
established through collective bargaining, making statistics difficult to compile.
7. Senator Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio), who held congressional hearings on pen-
sion fund investment policies in 1979, stated: "Pension funds have ... become one of the
most important sources of capital in the nation's financial markets. Without question, those
who manage pension funds are in a position to play a crucial role in determining the na-
ture and direction of the nation's economic growth and development." Pension Fund Invest-
ment Policies: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Citizens and Shareholders Rights and Remedies,
Comm. on theJudidary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1979).
8. In 1980, the AFL-CIO noted "four policy objectives of union participation in pen-
sion fund management." These were to increase employment through reindustrialization,
to advance social proposals, to improve the ability of workers to exercise their rights as
stock shareholders, and to exclude from pension plan investment portfolios companies hos-
tile to workers rights. PENS. REP., supra note 5, at R-16. See generally Kaiser, Labor's New
Weapon: Pension Fund Leverage, Can Labor Legally Beat Its Plowshares Into Swords? 34
RUTGERS L. REV. 409, 412-15 (1982) (describing labor's strategies for use of pension fund
control).
9. See H. GRAY, supra note 4, at 96-99; Kaiser, supra note 8, at 412-15.
10. See H. GRAY, supra note 4, at 108-12; Kaiser, supra note 8, at 412-15. Sea, e.g.,
LABOR & INVESTMENTS, May 1982, at 5 (examples of occasions on which unions have con-
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pension assets to finance home mortgages or other loans for fund
members.' Each of these strategies has met with some success,
but progress on the chief strategy of labor in pension asset
use-the investment of assets in unionized businesses to create
jobs-has been disappointing.
The main reason that unions have not been able to fully ex-
ploit the power of pension funds is that most unions lack any real
control over the management of their fund. Control lies in the
hands of the appointed trustees of the pension fund, and only a
small percentage of unions have the power to appoint trustees or
review the decisions that they make. Some form of control over
the trustees is a prerequisite for pension asset use by a union. 2
Though cognizant of this, most unions have been either unwilling
or unable to wrestle control from employers through the collec-
tive bargaining process."3 If the developments over the last ten
years serve as example, it seems clear that unions will not soon
take control over a significantly greater percentage of pension
fund capital than they now control.14 Until they do, union pen-
sions will not be revolutionized to advance organized labor's goals.
While labor has only begun the fight for wide-scale pension
fund control, the battle over the legality of one method of exercis-
ing this control, job-creating investments, rages in the meantime.
A small number of unions that already have some measure of dis-
cretionary authority over the operation of their fund have begun
to make use of their power to promote the kinds of interests that
labor advocated in the late 1970's. Most prominent among these
unions are those in the building and construction trades, which
have started to invest directly in capital real estate and building
projects that create jobs for their members. The permissability of
union pension fund investments for job creation under the Em-
fronted employers at shareholder meetings).
11. See H. GRAY, supra note 4, at 80-92. See generally WORKING PAPERS, July-Aug. 1981,
at 20 (critical of union pension fund investments as not being "terribly adventurous," be-
cause they have been somewhat limited to adminstratively simple, risk-free mortgage in-
vestments that displace other money already available on the market for mortgages). For
an example of a union pension fund mortgage program, see 10 PENS. REP. (BNA) No. 437,
at 552 (Mar. 28, 1983).
12. See infra notes 27-35 and accompanying text.
13. See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
14. Id.
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ployee Retirement Income Security Act of 197415 remains largely
in question, however. This uncertainty has not stopped construc-
tion unions from going forward with their investment projects,
even in the face of ERISA-based challenges from the Department
of Labor. 6 The resulting lawsuits have still not produced clear
legal standards for the proper interpretation of ERISA. 17 Clarifi-
cation is critical. Unions, employers, and pension fund partici-
pants and beneficiaries have too much at stake to permit fund
trustees to gamble on the legality of multi-million dollar invest-
ments. Organized labor anxiously awaits a clear set of standards,
as these will play a large part in determining the future of this
new strategy for all of organized labor.
This Comment addresses the current and possible future legal
implications of union pension fund investments that benefit un-
ions and their members. Specifically, it analyzes investments that
are designed to create jobs for union members. Section II of this
Comment will discuss the fundamental issue of control of pension
fund administration. An appreciation of this issue is essential for
putting the narrower issue of pension asset investment into its
context as a strategy of organized labor. Section III will provide
an overview of federal statutory law affecting private sector pen-
sion plans, with a focus on the rules regarding fiduciary responsi-
bility for asset management and investment. Section IV deals spe-
cifically with the legal issues surrounding fiduciary requirements
for investments designed to produce secondary or "collateral"
benefits, such as the creation of union jobs. Section V offers a crit-
ical analysis of the recent Florida district court decision in Brock v.
Walton."8 Walton is viewed by many as an important decision on
the issue of union job-creating investments, but this Comment will
argue that the weakness of the legal reasoning in this decision will
limit its precedential value. Section VI addresses the specific issue
of union pension fund investments strictly premised on the guar-
antee of union job creation. This issue, which I will refer to as the
15. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982)).
16. The Secretary of Labor is empowered to bring actions for civil enforcement of
ERISA. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. §
1132(a) (1982).
17. See infra notes 63-113 and accompanying text.
18. 609 F. Supp. 1221 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
3271986]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
"union-labor" investments issue, is examined closely because it lies
at the heart of this strategy for unions and because it presents spe-
cial problems of interpretation under ERISA. Case law under
ERISA has only scratched the surface of this issue, leaving in
doubt the legality of union labor investments. This Comment will
conclude by discussing the possible legal resolutions of this issue
and by suggesting the approach most consistent with the purposes
of ERISA.
II. PENSION FUND STRUCTURES AND THE REALITY OF CONTROL
Labor unions can be identified as the organizations princi-
pally responsible for the rapid growth in pension plans for Ameri-
can workers in the private sector since World War 11.19 In the late
1940's, the first national union agreements that provided for
worker pensions funded by employer contributions were negoti-
ated in the coal and auto industries.20 Since that time, the number
of private sector pension plans has risen dramatically, and pen-
sions are now seen as an integral part of the average worker's
compensation package. Today, approximately fifty million work-
ers in private sector employment in the United States, more than
half of the private sector labor force, are covered under pension
or related retirement plans.21 Roughly 40% of all private sector
plans are established through collective bargaining agreements. 22
For all of the great strides in the creation of workers' pensions
that unions have made, however, they have only minimal control
over the vast assets held by these funds.
The ability to control a pension fund is defined by the
amount of authority that the union has over decisions affecting
the collection, management, investment, and dispersal of fund as-
sets. Though vested participants have a recognized ownership in-
19. Pension plans covering employees in the public sector are not treated in this Com-
ment. These plans are not regulated by ERISA, thus the investment of their assets into job-
creating projects or for other "social" purposes raises different legal issues, mostly under
state law.
20. A more detailed discussion of this history and of the development of pension
funds in the United States in general can be found in H. GRAY, supra note 4, at 11-16.
21. Public Employee Pension Benefit Plans: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight
of the Comm. on Ways and Means and Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations of the Comm. on
Education and Labor, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 63 (1983).
22. AFL-CIO, supra note 1, at 20.
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terest in the assets held for their benefit,2 3 there is no legal right
to control which derives from this reality. The Supreme Court has
made this clear by deciding that pension asset ownership and pen-
sion asset control are truly separate notions. 24 The existence of
any real pension control, then, depends upon the structural type
of pension fund that the collective bargaining agreement creates.
The two principal types of administrative structures for pension
plans are employer-administered plans and employer-union jointly
administered plans.25 The difference between these structures lies
in the composition of the pension trust fund board of trustees, the
group of individuals who have the authority and bear the ultimate
responsibility for the handling of fund assets. 26
A. Employer-Administered vs. Jointly Administered Pension Plans
An employer-administered pension plan grants to the em-
ployer the authority to determine the members of the pension
fund board of trustees. These plans represent approximately 60%
of all private sector union plans.2 The boards of trustees of these
funds are usually composed of representatives of the employer
and of independent financial institutions such as banks, trust com-
panies, or insurance companies selected by the employer. The as-
sets are often held by institutional investors in the form of pension
trust funds or group annuity contracts. Trustees will contract with
professional investment managers to make decisions regarding the
investment of assets.
Under an employer-administered plan, the potential for
union involvement in pension fund asset management is severely
limited. As a result, some union's have experimented with forms
23. See Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 446 U.S. 359 (1980).
24. In Daniel v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 439 U.S. 551 (1980), the Court held that
federal securities law did not protect an employee from alleged fraud in the management
of his retirement pension fund because he had no investment interest in the funds' assets
cognizable under securities law.
25. Plans that were administered completely by union trustees were outlawed by the
Taft-Hartley Act in 1947. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 1947, Pub. L.
No. 80-101, § 302(c)(5), 61 Stat. 136, 157 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §
186(c)(5) (1982)) (an employer cannot pay money to a union unless the payments are held
in trust and subject to joint administration).
26. ERISA provides that all assets of employee benefit plans be held in trust by one or
more trustees. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 403, 29 U.S.C. §
1103 (1982).
27. AFL-CIO, supra note 1, at 20.
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of "indirect control" of fund management. Indirect control exists
where the collective bargaining agreement establishes the union
in some sort of advisory capacity to the fund trustees.2 Though
these experiments have received a fair amount of attention from
the labor movement, few would argue that these new structures,
which do not establish ultimate authority over asset management
decisions, will bring a large degree of pension control to organ-
ized labor. To some extent, these efforts show that the strategy
that began in the late 1970's to obtain and use pension control has
continued, but progress has been limited. Only a handful of un-
ions have successfully bargained for any form of direct or indirect
control in the last ten years.29 Today, the matter has become low
on the list of priorities for unions that see themselves as facing
more critical issues in collective bargaining, such as job and wage
protection.
Jointly administered pension plans, or "Taft-Hartley" funds,
once established through collective bargaining, are required by
law to have boards of trustees composed of an equal number of
union and employer representatives.30 Jointly trusteed plans re-
present approximately 40% of all union plans.31 As with em-
ployer-administered plans, the trustees of these plans often engage
the services of independent financial institutions, but here only as
investment managers or actuaries, not as fund trustees. As with
employer-administered plans, fund assets are most often held in
pension trust funds or group annuity contracts through banks,
trust companies, or insurance companies. The principle difference
from employer funds lies in the fact that, with joint funds, the
28. The Industrial Union Department of the AFL-CIO has cited several ways in which
unions can gain a voice in pension fund investments without establishing joint administra-
tion. These include securing a say in the appointment of fund trustees, participating in the
selection of investment managers, and negotiating an agreement identifying particular in-
vestment goals. PENS. REP. (BNA) No. 294, at R-8 (June 9, 1980). See, e.g., LABOR & INVEST-
MENTs, Jan. 1981, at 6 (cases where unions have bargained for a voice in fund
administration).
29. Major union bargaining achievements for greater pension fund control are chroni-
cled in Labor and Investments, a publication of the Industrial Union Department of the
AFL-CIO. Few have been reported over the last five years. See, e.g., LABOR & INVESTMENTS,
Jan. 1981, at 6-7; Id, Mar. 1981, at 1; Id., Apr. 1981, at 5; Id., Dec. 1983-Jan. 1984, at 1.
30. Jointly administered pension plans are regulated by section 302(c)(5) of the Taft-
Hartley Act. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 1947, § 302(c)(5), 29 U.S.C.
§ 186(c)(5)(1982).
31. AFL-CIO, supra note 1, at 20.
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ultimate authority for decisions about the management of assets
rests with the union and the employer representatives who serve
as trustees, not with institutional investor trustees.32
The potential for using pension fund assets to promote the
interests of unions is greatest with joint administration for the
simple reason that the union controls one-half of the voting seats
on the fund's board of trustees. The fact is, however, that many
of these funds operate in a surprisingly similar fashion to em-
ployer-administered plans with regard to investment decisions."
Professional investment managers traditionally have made the in-
vestment decisions for these funds, with little supervision from
employer and union trustees who may lack the financial sophisti-
cation to oversee them. Lack of union trustee sophistication has
been a major obstacle to union pension control. The AFL-CIO
has recognized this problem. In 1980, the federation promised its
member unions that it would develop programs for information
and training of union trustees interested in making job-creating
investments.3 4 No initiatives have been taken since 1980, and, in-
deed, it appears the AFL-CIO has lost some interest in taking a
leadership role in the area of pension control.3 5
B. Structure and Control in Construction Industry Pension Plans
The major exceptions to the trend of labor unions cooling on
the idea of pension fund control and investment are unions in the
building and construction trades. Though long considered to be
among the most conservative labor unions, construction unions
32. Under Taft-Hartley, a jointly administered pension plan may have as its trustees
only representatives of the employer and the union. Labor Management Relations (Taft-
Hartley) Act, 1947, § 302(c)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1982). No such requirement exists
under ERISA. Thus, employer-administered funds are free to delegate the trusteeship to
other individuals or institutions.
33. Telephone interview with Randy Barber, co-author of The North Shall Rise Again:
Pensions, Politics and Power in the 1980's, and editor of Labor and Investments, a monthly
publication of the Industrial Union Department of the AFL-CIO.
34. PENS. REP., supra note 5.
35. Mention of pension control is conspicuously absent from the AFL-CIO's recent
policy statement on the strategies for organized labor's future. See AMERICAN FED'N OF LA-
BOR-CONG. OF INDUS. ORGS., THE CHANGING SITUATION OF WORKERS AND THEIR UNIONS
(1985). At the AFL-CIO national convention in November 1985, the federation merely
approved resolutions relating to pension control and investments that were drawn almost
entirely from the then five-year-old Investment of Union Pension Funds report. AFL-CIO,
supra note 1. See AFL-CIO NEWS, Nov. 9, 1985, at 8.
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have pushed to the forefront of this progressive strategy to pro-
mote unionism. They are doing it primarily by pooling the pen-
sion assets of different construction unions in the same regional
areas into investment foundations that invest in real estate devel-
opment projects which put their members to work. In 1984, con-
struction union investment foundations financed $240 million
worth of real estate projects.36
A major factor promoting this development among construc-
tion unions is the administrative structure of their pension plans,
which are of the jointly administered, multiemployer variety.3 7
These plans are administered by an equal number of representa-
tives of the union and of the group of employers who contribute
to the fund. This structure is used in the construction industry
because it allows construction workers, who often move from em-
ployer to employer while remaining members of the same union,
to maintain their pensions. Under this structure, unions enjoy the
basic advantage for pension control that joint administration car-
ries." The multiemployer characteristic provides an additional ad-
vantage because it puts the union in the position of having more
trustees on the board than any single employer, creating de facto
control of the fund by the union. Construction unions have main-
tained these types of plans for years, and many union trustees
have developed a certain amount of fund management expertise
from their experience in control positions on the boards. This
structure is well suited, then, to the strategy of union job-creating
investments that some construction unions have begun to
implement.
III. THE LAW OF PENSIONS AND PENSION INVESTING
A. Pre-ERISA
Prior to 1974, pension law in this country consisted mainly of
the common law of trusts within individual states. Most of the
common law was consistent with respect to fiduciary requirements
36. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, May 13, 1985, at 74.
37. Multiemployer plans are regulated by special provisions under ERISA. These pro-
visions were added to ERISA by the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-364, 94 Stat. 1208 (1980) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1453
(1982)).
38. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
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for pension fund management.39 The common law imposed on fi-
duciaries the time-honored "prudent man" standard of fund man-
agement, as well as the duty to act "solely in the interest" of plan
participants and beneficiaries. 40 This duty included rules prohibit-
ing fiduciaries from "self-dealing" with fund assets in order to
protect against conflicts of interest.4 1 These fundamental com-
mon-law principles provided the framework for the fiduciary re-
quirements of ERISA when it was enacted to preempt state com-
mon law for private plans.42
Also predating ERISA are the requirements for pension plans
under the Internal Revenue Code, which regulates pensions by
virtue of its authorization of tax-exempt status for qualified
plans. 43 For a fund to enjoy tax-exempt status, the Code requires
that it be maintained by fiduciaries for the "exclusive benefit" of
employees and beneficiaries, 4 a rule that has been carried over
into the language of ERISA.45 Since 1974, the Code has not been
invoked by courts to impose fiduciary standards separate from
ERISA, but its detailed requirements for qualification for tax ex-
emption still apply.
The Taft-Hartley Ac 6 regulates private pension plans estab-
lished through collective bargaining. Section 302(c)(5) contains
provisions aimed at protecting pension fund assets from union
corruption and fraud. Among them is an "exclusive benefit"
provision similar to that contained in the Internal Revenue Code.
In application, both prior to ERISA and especially since, Taft-
Hartley has been treated as concerned primarily with fraudulent
39. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227 (1959). See also 2 A. SCOTT, THE LAW
OF TRUSTS § 170 (3d. ed. 1967).
40. RESTATEMENT, (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, supra note 39; A. SCOTT, supra note 39.
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, supra note 39; A. SCOTT, supra note 39.
42. See infra notes 49-62 and accompanying text.
43. The requirements for qualification for tax exemption are contained in section
401(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 401(a) (1982).
44. Id.
45. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 404(a)(1)(a); 29 U.S.C. §
1104(a)(1)(A) (1982); see infra note 61.
46. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 1947, §§ 1-303, 29 U.S.C. §§
141-187 (1982).
47. Taft-Hartley attempted to limit the potential for union corruption in pension
funds by completely outlawing union-administered plans. Id. at § 302(c)(5), 29 U.S.C. §
186(c) (5). The Act also requires that there be a written agreement detailing the basis on
which payments are to be made. Id.
1986] 333
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fund dealings by unions and not as applying general fiduciary
standards for fund management. 48
B. ERISA
ERISA was signed into law on Labor Day, September 2, 1974
by President Gerald Ford. It is the only comprehensive employee
benefits legislation ever passed in the United States, enacted to
protect the interests of participants and beneficiaries of employee
benefit plans by improving their equitable character and financial
soundness.49 The law affects all private employee benefit plans 0
such as pension, health, disability, and profit sharing plans. Its
provisions apply to participants and beneficiaries 51 of private pen-
sion and welfare plans, as well as to employers, labor organiza-
tions, insurance companies, banks, and other persons or organiza-
tions involved in employee benefit plans. ERISA preempts all state
laws relating to private benefit plans,52 and although it does not
preempt the Internal Revenue Code or the Taft-Hartley provi-
sions for pension plans, it effectively takes from these statutes any
independent regulation of pension fund fiduciary duty. Besides fi-
48. See Hutchison & Cole, Legal Standards Governing Investment of Pension Assets for So-
cial and Political Goals, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1340, 1348-49 (1980).
49. Concern over the inadequate regulation of employee benefits plans in Congress
had been strong since the late 1950's. The Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, Pub.
L. No. 85-836, 72 Stat. 997 (1958) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 301-309 (1970 & Supp. 1972)),
was passed in 1958, but by 1962 dissatisfaction with that Act led President Kennedy to
appoint a cabinet-level committee to study the equitable character of pension plans in the
United States and to recommend changes in federal legislation. The reports that they
would produce, after long congressional consideration, eventually led to the passage of
ERISA in 1974, which repealed the Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure Act. See the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § I I(a)(1), 29 U.S.C § 1031(a)(1) (1982).
See D. McGiLL, FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 32-35 (5th ed. 1984), for a more de-
tailed description of these events.
50. ERISA does not regulate "governmental" plans-plans covering public employ-
ees. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 4(b)(1), 29 U.S.C.. §
1003(b)(1) (1982).
51. A "participant" is defined in ERISA as any employee or former employee "who is
or may become eligible to receive a benefit of any type from an employee benefit plan."
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 3(7), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7)
(1982). A "beneficiary" is defined as "a person designated by a participant, or by terms of
an employee benefit plan, who is or may become entitled to a benefit thereunder." Id. §
3(8), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(8).
52. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 1947, § 503(a), 29 U.S.C. §
144(a) (1982).
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duciary standards, 53 ERISA provisions relating to pension plans
include reporting and disclosure requirements," participant eligi-
bility and vesting requirements, 5 minimum funding standards,5 6
and plan termination insurance through the creation of the Pen-
sion Benefit Guarantee Corporation.5 7 Responsibility for enforce-
ment of the Act belongs to the Secretary of Labor and the Secre-
tary of the Treasury.58 The federal district courts have exclusive
jurisdiction for civil cases arising out of the enforcement of
ERISA.59
C. ERISA Fiduciary Standards
All regulation of private pension fund asset management is
now accomplished under ERISA section 404(a)(1), its standards
for fiduciaries. "Fiduciary" is defined broadly under the Act. It
includes all those individuals who exercise control or discretion in
the management of plan assets, who provide investment advice for
the plan, and who have discretionary authority in administering
the plan.60
Section 404(a)(1) sets forth fiduciary duties in language bor-
rowed heavily from common law, the Internal Revenue Code, and
the Taft-Hartley Act. It states that fiduciaries shall discharge their
duties "solely in the interest of participants and beneficiaries,"
and: (a) for the "exclusive purpose" of providing benefits and de-
fraying administrative expenses; (b) as a "prudent man" would to
conduct the enterprise under the circumstances; (c) by "diversify-
53. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, §§ 401-414, 29 U.S.C. §§
1101-1114 (1982). See infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
54. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, §§ 101-111, 29 US.C. §§
1021-1031 (1982).
55. Id. §§ 201-211, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1061.
56. Id. §§ 301-306, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1086.
57. Id. §§ 4001-4048, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1348.
58. Id. §§501-515, 3001-3004, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1204.
59. Id. § 502(e), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e).
60. ERISA's definition of "fiduciary" reads:
[A] person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he exercises any
discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of such
plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition
of its assets, (ii) he renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation,
direct or indirect, with respect to any monies or other property of such plan, or
has any authority or responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has any discretionary
authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of such plan.
Id. § 3(21)(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(a).
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ing" plan investments; and (d) in conformity with "documents and
instruments" governing the plan."
In addition to the general duties imposed on fiduciaries, cer-
tain specific types of conduct are expressly prohibited under sec-
tion 406(b). These "prohibited transactions" cover two major
types of conflict of interest transactions-those between the plan
and parties in interest, and those that amount to self-dealing on
the part of a fiduciary.62
61. ERISA requires that:
[A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the inter-
est of the participants and the beneficiaries and -
(A) for the exclusive purpose of:
(i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries and
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan;
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances
then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with
such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character with
like aims;
(C) by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk of
large losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do so;
and
(D) in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan
insofar as such documents and instruments are consistent with the provisions of
this subchapter.
Id. § 404(a)(1), 29 US.C. § 1104(a)(1).
62. ERISA's prohibited transaction rule provides:
(a) Transactions between plan and party in interest.
Except as provided in section 1108 of this title:
(1) A fiduciary with respect to a plan shall not cause the plan to en-
gage in a transaction, if he knows or should know that such transaction consti-
tutes a direct or indirect-
(A) sale or exchange, or leasing, of any property between the
plan and a party in interest;
(B) lending of money or other extension of credit between the
plan and a party in interest;
(C) furnishing of goods, services, or facilities between the plan
and a party in interest;
(D) transfer to, or use by or for the benefit of, a party in inter-
est, of any assets of the plan; or
(E) acquisition, on behalf of the plan, of any employer security
or employer real property in violation of section 1107(a) of this title.
(2) No fiduciary who has authority or discretion to control or man-
age the assets of a plan shall permit the plan to hold any employer security or
employer real property if he knows or should know that holding such security
or real property violates section 1107(a) of this title.
(b) Transactions between plan and fiduciary.
A fiduciary with respect to a plan shall not-
(1) deal with the assets of the plan in his own interest or for his own
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IV. JOB-CREATING INVESTMENTS UNDER ERISA FIDUCIARY
STANDARDS
ERISA's fiduciary requirements can be separated into three
principal categories for analysis of their application to job-creating
and other union-promoting investments: (1) prohibited transac-
tions; (2) the prudence rule; and (3) the duty of loyalty. 3 These
requirements, and the obstacles they present for these invest-
ments, are discussed in detail in this Section. In essence, the pro-
hibited transactions rule involves fairly clear prohibitions and ex-
emptions for specific types of investments. The prudence rule
defines the type of expert profit-maximizing conduct that is ex-
pected of fiduciaries, but it limits not so much choices of vehicles
for investment as it does regulate trustee expectations for return
on investment. The duty of loyalty poses more difficult questions
for fund fiduciaries considering job-creating investments than do
the other standards because it imposes a nebulous set of rules re-
stricting investments that attempt to serve purposes secondary to
the purpose of maintaining the fund's financial health.
account,
(2) in his individual or in any other capacity act in any transaction
involving the plan on behalf of a party (or represent a party) whose interests are
adverse to the interest of the plan or the interests of its participants or benefi-
ciaries, or
(3) receive any consideration for his own personal account from any
party dealing with such plan in connection with a transaction involving the as-
sets of the plan.
(c) Transfer of real or personal property to plan by party in interest.
A transfer of real or personal property by a party in interest to a plan shall
be treated as a sale or exchange if the property is subject to a mortgage or
similar lien which a party-in-interest placed on the property within the 10-year
period ending on the date of the transfer.
Id. § 406, 29 U.S.C. § 1106.
63. These categories represent one currently accepted convention for categorizing the
three different types of rules that ERISA imposes on fiduciaries. "Prohibited Transactions"
are contained in section 406 of ERISA. The "Prudence Rule" is derived from the lan-
guage in section 404(B). It is used here as also including the diversification requirement in
section 404(c). The "Duty of Loyalty" describes the ERISA requirements contained in sec-
tion 404 and section 404(A) that fiduciaries act "solely in the interest" and for the "exclu-
sive purpose" of participants and beneficiaries. ERISA section 404(D) provides that fiducia-
ries operate the plan "in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the
plan .. " This requirement, which is fairly straightforward, is not isolated for indepen-
dent analysis here. See, e.g., Bredhoff, Collective Bargaining for Socially Responsible Investment
of Pension and Welfare Fund Assets: Another Look at ERISA, LABOR & INVESTMENTS, July-Aug.
1982, at 3-8.
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A. Prohibited Transactions Rule
The prohibited transactions rule identifies specific types of
transactions that violate ERISA fiduciary standards." Generally, it
can be described as fleshing out the prudence and loyalty rules of
ERISA, though it may also bar transactions not otherwise in viola-
tion of these rules. The prohibited transactions rule proscribes
loans and sales between pension plan and "parties in interest,"6 5 a
term used to define individuals or organizations that benefit from
fiduciary self-dealing."' Prohibited conduct also includes dealing
with plan assets for a fiduciary's own interest or account, or en-
gaging in transactions with any party whose interests are adverse
to those of the plan. 67
The statute contains several statutory exemptions to the pro-
hibited transactions rule for certain classes of transactions."8 It
also authorizes a procedure for exemptions made on a case-by-
case basis by the Secretary of Labor.69 These exemptions are
based on the notion that some transactions involve technical viola-
tions of the rule but do not have the undesirable effects that it
seeks to curb. The statute is strictly applied, however, to all non-
exempt violations, including those that may lack an improper mo-
tivation or fail to result in any actual harm. 0
The prohibited transactions rule does not prohibit pension in-
vesting for union promotion or other social goals where the enter-
prise invested in is not related in some way to a fund or its trust-
ees.71 Where a fund seeks to create jobs for its working
participants by investing in the business of its plan sponsor/em-
ployer, a prohibited transaction problem naturally arises because
the plan sponsor is a party in interest. Similarly, investments in
enterprises that guarantee the creation of jobs for members of the
64. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 502(e), 29 U.S.C. §
1132(e) (1982).
65. Id. § 406(a), 29 US.C. § 1106(a).
66. Id. § 3(14), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14).
67. Id. § 406(b), 29 US.C. § 1106(b).
68. Id. § 408(b), 29 US.C. § 1108(b).
69. Id. § 408(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(a).
70. See McDougall v. Donovan, 552 F. Supp. 1206, 1215 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Freund v.
Marshall & Ilsley Bank, 485 F. Supp. 629, 637 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
71. See generally M. LEIBIG, SOCIAL INVESTMENTS AND THE LAW 24-25 (1980) ("None of
the prohibited transactions outlaw the consideration of non-self-serving, noneconomic cri-
teria in pension investments.").
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sponsor/union plan are potentially violative of the prohibited
transactions rule because the union is also a party in interest. Lim-
ited exemptions for such investments, outlined here, can partially
accommodate these investments under the prohibited transactions
rule.
Pension plans may invest in the securities or real property of
the sponser/employer plan without violating the prohibited trans-
actions rule where the investment does not exceed 10% of the fair
market value of the plans' assets. 2 For multiemployer plans, there
is a more liberal provision relating to investments in real estate
construction projects. Through a special class of exemptions
promulgated by the Department of Labor and the Internal Reve-
nue Service, these funds may make construction loans to fund
sponsoring employers up to the value of 35% of the fund assets, so
long as no more than 10% is loaned to a single employer and cer-
tain safeguards are met.73 This favorable treatment under ERISA
goes a long way in explaining why construction industry unions
have an advantage over other unions making job-creating invest-
ments from their pension funds.
B. The Prudence Rule
ERISA section 404(a)(1)(B) provides that fiduciaries shall dis-
charge their duties "with the care, skill, prudence and diligence
under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man act-
ing in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in
the conduct of an enterprise of a like character with like aims.71'
The ERISA prudence rule imposes a stricter standard on fiducia-
ries than did the common law "prudent man" standard.7 5 The
ERISA rule has been characterized as imposing a "prudent ex-
pert" standard, having expanded the standard from the behavior
of one managing one's own affairs to the behavior of one "famil-
72. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 407, 29 U.S.C. § 1107
(1982).
73. 41 Fed. Reg. 12,740, 12,743 (1976) (Prohibited Transaction Exemption 76-1).
74. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1104(a)(1)(B) (1982); see supra note 61.
75. The landmark decision that generated the American common law "prudent man"
rule is Harvard College v. Armory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 461 (1830). This rule represented a
significant departure from English common law. See M. LEIBIG, supra note 71, at 1-3.
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iar with such matters. '17
Department of Labor regulations interpreting ERISA's pru-
dence rule detail the factors to be considered when assessing the
prudence of investment decisions." Considerations of risk of loss
and opportunity for gain are of paramount importance. Other
factors that must be considered include diversification, liquidity,
and projected rate of return. The Department of Labor does not
define these requirements by setting numerical standards that
each investment must meet. Instead, it has adopted a "whole-port-
folio" approach, which considers the prudence of individual in-
vestments taken in light of the entire investment portfolio.7 8
Under this approach, fiduciaries must take into account specific
circumstances of the plan-its size, financial health, extent of di-
versification, and so forth in assessing the role that each invest-
ment plays in the portfolio. In certain cases, then, higher risk or
lower yield investments may satisfy prudence requirements where
the fund is already well invested in blue-chip securities and is look-
ing to test the market in other areas. This principle is bolstered by
ERISA's diversification requirement in section 404(a)(1)(c), which
encourages a blend of investments." Under the whole-portfolio
approach, the performance of fiduciaries is not judged by the suc-
cess or failure of single investments, but by the performance of
the entire portfolio.80
Due in large part to the whole-portfolio approach, there is a
certain amount of room for job-creating or other socially sensitive
investments under the prudence rule. The Department of Labor
regulations have created a rule for investments that, though strin-
gent in terms of the degree of asset management expertise re-
quired, is not so inflexible as to prohibit investments made in part
with noneconomic motivations (such as creating jobs or improving
a local economic climate). Though commentators initially dis-
agreed as to what obstacles the prudence rule put up for such in-
vestments,' it is now fairly clear that the Department of Labor
76. M. LEiBIG, supra note 71, at 21-22. See also Bredhoff, supra note 63, at 5 n.35.
77. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-1 (1985).
78. Id. See also 44 Fed. Reg. 37, 221-25 (1979).
79. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 404(a)(1)(C), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1104(a)(1)(C) (1982).
80. See Hutchinson & Cole, supra note 48, at 1355-56.
81. Compare Hutchinson & Cole, supra note 48, at 1352-59 with Langbein & Posner,
Social Investing and the Law of Trusts, 79 MIcH. L. REV. 72, 96-107 (1980).
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will not challenge them based exclusively on a prudence theory. 2
To summarize, if fiduciaries of union plans adopt an invest-
ment policy that is designed to meet the overall needs of the fund
by giving proper attention to such factors as risk, diversification,
and liquidity, it will satisfy the Department of Labor's interpreta-
tion of the ERISA prudence rule. Within the general exercise of
prudence, single investments that serve additional purposes as well
as the funds needs are permissible. Certainly, some union promot-
ing investments may be challenged on the grounds that they have
put the plan assets at too great a risk or have violated diversifica-
tion or liquidity requirements. Such investments would violate the
prudence rule regardless of the fact that they are motivated by
union goals.8 These are not the cases that generate debate over
job-creating pension investments. The difficult legal questions are
presented by those investments that are permissible under
ERISA's prudence standard, that are also not prohibited under
ERISA's prohibited transactions rule, but that push at the limits
of another of ERISA's fiduciary requirements-the duty of
loyalty.
C. The Duty of Loyalty
Beyond avoiding prohibited transactions and meeting the cri-
teria for prudence, plan fiduciaries must meet ERISA require-
ments creating a duty of loyalty to plan participants and benefi-
ciaries. Section 404(a)(1) stipulates that fiduciaries must act "solely
in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries, '"" as well as
"for the exclusive purpose of: (i) providing benefits to participants
82. The Department of Labor has not taken the position in any case brought against a
pension fund that a socially or union motivated investment presents a per se violation of
the prudence requirement. Prudence challenges that have been made were factually based,
concerning such issues as return or risk, and were usually coupled with claims for violation
of ERISA's other fiduciary requirements. See, e.g., Donovan v. Mazzola, 716 F.2d 1226 (9th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 704 (1984); Brock v. Walton, 609 F. Supp. 1221 (S.D.
Fla. 1985); Marshall v. Glass/Metal Assoc. & Glaziers & Glassworkers Pension Plan, 507 F.
Supp. 378 (D. Hawaii 1980).
83. See, e.g., Donovan v. Mazzola, 716 F.2d 1226 (9th Cir. 1983) (construction loan
imprudent because of inadequate security on the loan); Marshall v. Glass/Metal Assoc. &
Glaziers & Glassworkers Pension Plan, 507 F. Supp. 378 (D. Hawaii 1980) (construction
loan made without adequate consideration of risks, alternatives available, and need for
diversification).
84. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. §
1104(a)(1) (1982).
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and their beneficiaries; and (ii) defraying reasonable expenses of
administering the plan.""5 Together they form what is referred to
as the "duty of loyalty" requirement for fiduciaries.86
The duty of loyalty has been characterized by the Supreme
Court as imposing on fiduciaries "an unwavering duty of complete
loyalty to the beneficiar[ies] of the trust, to the exclusion of inter-
ests of all other parties.11 7 Of course, this does not mean that it is
unlawful for parties other than the fund to derive some benefit
from the acts of fiduciaries; that business transactions such as in-
vestments are designed to be mutually beneficial is a truism. The
critical inquiry is to what extent investments are permitted when
they are motivated, in whole or in part, by expected benefit to
parties other than the fund itself. In brief, judicial interpretation
of the duty of loyalty has been to allow these investments only
where their primary purpose is still to benefit the fund. 8 Recent
case law makes clear that fiduciaries may consider "collateral ben-
efits" to secondary parties when making investment decisions, so
long as these considerations do not supplant the primary purpose
of providing benefits to the fund.8 9 An analysis of the important
case law on the duty of loyalty will provide insight into how deter-
minations are made as to when a collateral benefit becomes the
primary purpose of an investment.
The leading pre-ERISA duty of loyalty case is Blankenship v.
Boyle. 90 Blankenship involved, inter alia, investments by the United
Mine Workers' pension fund made to coerce utility companies
into purchasing coal supplies from UMW-organized suppliers.
The district court held that the trustees had breached their fiduci-
85. Id. § 404(a)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A).
86. Some commentators initially suggested that the "solely in the interest" and "ex-
clusive benefit" language of ERISA § 404(a)(1) imposed separate requirements. See Hutchi-
son & Cole, supra note 48, at 1359-71. The "duty of loyalty" terminology here refers to a
combination of the two, interpreted as applying essentially one basic rule. See supra note
63. Courts applying § 404(a)(1) in recent years have treated them as one rule, though the
terminology used varies. See, e.g., Donovan v. Bierwith, 680 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 1069 (1982) ("solely in the interest/exclusive purpose"); Davidson v.
Cook, 567 F. Supp. 225 (E.D. Va. 1983) ("sole and exclusive interest"); Donovan v. Daugh-
erty, 550 F. Supp. 390 (S.D. Ala. 1982) ("solely in the interest").
87. NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329 (1981).
88. See infra notes 98-113 and accompanying text.
89. Id.
90. 329 F. Supp. 1089 (D.D.C. 1971), stay denied per curiam, 447 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir.
1971), affd mem., 511 F.2d 447 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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ary duty, stating: "[T]he Fund was acting primarily for the collat-
eral benefit of the Union and the signatory operators in making
most of its utility stock acquisitions. '91
Some commentators have cited Blankenship for the proposi-
tion that the duty of loyalty presents a barrier for pension funds
investing to achieve collateral benefits.2 Case law since Blanken-
ship, however, has interpreted it as meaning that investments mo-
tivated by collateral interests only violate the duty of loyalty where
these interests, and not the best interests of the fund, are its pri-
mary purpose.93 In Blankenship, the investment was detrimental to
the participants and beneficiaries because it did not assure an ade-
quate return. The investment was determined to be unlawful be-
cause the fund made financial sacrifices to achieve the collateral
benefit, not merely because a collateral benefit was achieved. As
the Washington Supreme Court stated in Culinary Workers Health
and Welfare Trust v. Gateway Cafe: "The language in Blankenship
referencing collateral benefits to the union was not intended to be
descriptive of the general obligations of the trustees . ..as we
noted in discussing the LMRA, some degree of collateral interest
is permissible. 9 4
Withers v. Teachers Retirement System of New York95 was the first
case that ratified a pension investment challenged on the grounds
that it served collateral interests. Though its precedential value is
limited because it concerns a public employee plan which was reg-
ulated not by ERISA but by state law, it is valuable because it
sheds light on the collateral benefit rule developed since Blanken-
ship. In this case, participants of the pension plan challenged the
trustees decision to purchase New York City municipal bonds at a
time when the city was threatened with bankruptcy. The court
approved the investment based on the unique circumstances of
the case. It took cognizance of the fact that the city was the pri-
mary contributor to the fund and that, by investing to insure the
city's financial health, the trustees also insured "the survival of
91. Id. at 1106 (emphasis added).
92. See, e.g., Langbein & Posner, supra note 81, at 97.
93. See, e.g., Culinary Workers Health & Welfare Trust v. Gateway Cafe, 91 Wash. 2d
353, 361-62, 588 P.2d 1344, 1340-41 (1979) (applies Blankenship as having weight for in-
terpreting the ERISA duty of loyalty).
94. Id. at 361, 588 P.2d at 1340.
95. 447 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), affid 595 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1979).
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'the fund as an entity.' "96 The court distinguished the Blankenship
ruling as one that involved a primary motivation to serve the col-
lateral benefit. 97 Though, like Blankenship, this investment in-
volved certain sacrifices (here in terms of increased risk), the court
found that they were made primarily for the benefit of the fund
itself, and not the city. In essence, the court took a broad view of
the duty of loyalty, permitting an investment that posed obvious
sacrifices in the short run but that could result in overriding bene-
fits in the long run. Withers offers a bold interpretation of the duty
of loyalty not yet taken by courts applying ERISA.
The federal courts applying ERISA have expressed accept-
ance of the basic collateral benefit rule that investment decisions
will not be deemed to be violative of the duty simply because they
serve a collateral purpose. Among the first statements of approval
came in Donovan v. Beirwith.9 8 Beirwith involved the use of pension
assets to purchase additional stock of the plan sponsor/employer's
company in order to avert an outside takeover attempt. The court
held the investment to be unlawful, but stated: "Officers of corpo-
rations who are trustees of its pension plan do not violate their
duties as trustees by taking action which, after careful and impar-
tial investigation, they reasonably conclude best to promote the
interests of participants and beneficiaries simply because it inci-
dentally benefits the corporation or, indeed, themselves .... "9
Soon thereafter, the Beirwith reasoning was applied in Morse v.
Stanley,100 which involved a different fact pattern, 0a 1 but articu-
lated the same principle: "It is no violation of a trustee's fiduciary
duties to take into account a course of action which reasonably
96. Id. at 1259.
97.
Blankenship was thus a case in which the trustees pursued policies which may
incidentally have aided the beneficiaries of the fund but which were intended,
primarily, to enhance the position of the union and the welfare of its members,
presumably, through the creation and/or preservation ofjobs in the coal indus-
try. The decision is inapplicable here.
Id. at 1256.
98. 680 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1069 (1982).
99. Id. at 271.
100. 566 F. Supp. 1455 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), a ffd in part and rev'd on other grounds, 732
F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1984).
101. In Morse, the trustees of a profit-sharing plan, who were also senior managers of
the employer, refused to accelerate profit-sharing payments to a departing employee. 566
F. Supp. at 1456-57.
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best promotes the interests of plan participants simply because it
incidentally also benefits the corporation." ' 2 The Department of
Labor has consented with this view that investments do not violate
the duty of loyalty solely for the reason that they also create a
collateral benefit. 10 3 Indeed, it is arguable that this view is sup-
ported by ERISA's legislative history. 1
0 4
The current collateral benefit rule leaves to the courts the
task of discovering the primary motives behind investment deci-
sions on a case-by-case basis. The cases cited above establish that
collateral benefits are permissible, but they fashion no guidelines
for determining which benefits should be considered as merely in-
cidental and which should be considered the primary purpose of
the investment. The current approach is perhaps best articulated
in Davidson v. Cook, a case involving an unlawful pension invest-
ment directly benefitting the union: "Proving purpose or intent is
always difficult, and the court must rely on circumstantial evi-
dence and reasonable inferences to reach its conclusion that the
fiduciaries were attempting to also satisfy the desires and needs of
the [union]."'10 5 Evidence that has weight in proving primary pur-
pose includes the identity of the party benefiting, 06 the methodol-
ogy used by the trustees in making the decision,"' and the cost or
102. Morse, 732 F.2d at 1146 (citing with approval Donovan v. Beirwith, 680 F.2d 263
(2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied 459 U.S. 1069 (1982)).
103. Former Department of Labor Administrator of Pension and Welfare Benefit Pro-
grams Ian D. Lanoff expressed the Department's view to Congress in 1979: "If, after eval-
uating other factors, two investments appear to be equally desirable [in economic terms],
then social judgments are permissible in determining which to select." Pension Fund Invest-
ment Policy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopoly and Business Rights of the Sen-
ate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (Part II) 4 (1979).
104. See generally Bredhoff, supra note 63, at 6-7 (arguing that ERISA's legislative his-
tory provides "affirmative evidence" that Congress intended the duty of loyalty to be inter-
preted as applying a duty similar to that previously imposed under the Internal Revenue
Code and the Taft-Hartley Act, which did not prohibit collateral benefit investments per
se).
105. 567 F. Supp. 225, 236 (E.D. Va. 1983).
106. Collateral benefits that come to parties related to the pension fund are likely to
raise the inference that fiduciary duties have been violated. See, e.g., Leigh v. Engle, 727
F.2d 113 (7th Cir. 1983) (trustees unlawfully benefit from use of pension assets to purchase
stocks in trustees own investment portfolio); Davidson v. Cook, 567 F. Supp. 225 (E.D. Va.
1983) (pension plan co-sponsor local union unlawfully benefits when trustees make mort-
gage loan to a wholly owned real estate subsidiary of local union).
107. See, e.g., Donovan v. Beirwith, 680 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1069 (1982) (court focuses on methodology followed by trustees in making investment de-
cision, rather than on merits of investment itself).
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benefit of the transaction to the fund. 08 Consistent with the flexi-
bility of this approach, none of these factors alone or in any par-
ticular combination have been held to be necessarily dispositive of
the issue.10 9
One factor that the courts have refused to consider when
searching for primary purpose is the potential that collateral ben-
efit investments may have for long-term, indirect benefits to the
fund itself. The argument is that trustees' decisions that ultimately
serve the fund as the primary interest, though they initially seem
to promote the collateral interest as primary, should satisfy the
duty of loyalty. This argument was not considered under common
law in Blankenship,' °  and it was rejected under ERISA in
Beirwith." a Though it found favor in Withers,"12 no federal court
applying ERISA has accorded that case any weight, probably be-
cause it involved state law and could easily be distinguished on its
facts.' 13
The above discussion summarizes the judicial understanding
of the duty of loyalty under ERISA and its corollary collateral
benefit rule at the time Brock v. Walton came to bar. The court in
this case was faced with applying these nebulous rules to a difficult
fact situation never before addressed by the courts-one where
the primary and incidental purposes were so intertwined, and
where the expected benefits to each were so great, that an equita-
ble result would be nearly impossible to reach under these rules.
Because it failed to explicitly recognize or sufficiently deal with
this dilemma, this case does little more than add to the confusion
surrounding ERISA's duty of loyalty.
108. See, e.g., Morse v. Stanley, 556 F. Supp. 1455 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) affd in part and
i-ev'd on other grounds, 732 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1984) (plan management decision that served
collateral benefit as well as having a positive impact on the fund's financial reserve held
lawful); Brink v. DaLesio, 496 F. Supp. 1350 (D. Md. 1980), affd in part and rev'd on other
grounds 667 F.2d 420 (4th Cir. 1981) (investment creating collateral benefit at the possible
or actual expense of the plan's participants and beneficiaries held unlawful). But cf. Dono-
van v. Daugherty, 550 F. Supp. 390, 410 n.21 (S.D. Ala. 1982) ("A violation of section
404(a) is not dependent on a finding of monetary loss.").
109. See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text. In none of the cases cited has a
court held any single factor to be determinative.
110. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 95-96.
346 [Vol. 35
UNION PENSION FUND INVESTMENT
V. BROCK V. WALTON-UNION INVESTMENT AFFIRMED
A. The District Court Decision
Brock v. Walton1 14 has been hailed by organized labor and
other observers as the decision that sets a firm and favorable pre-
cedent for union pension investments that create jobs.11 5 The
court in this case approved investments by the jointly adminis-
tered, multiemployer pension fund of Local 675 of the Operating
Engineers International Union in a southern Florida real estate
project which was developed exclusively through the use of Local
675 laborers. The Department of Labor challenged the invest-
ments in federal court on the grounds that the trustees of the
fund breached their fiduciary duties in making the investments.1
In a lengthy opinion tailored closely to the facts of the case, Flor-
ida District Court Judge Gonzalez granted defendant trustees' mo-
tion for summary judgment, stating: "The Department's charges
are indeed serious, but its bark is worse than its bite. . . the [De-
partment of Labor] was simply unable to prove its case by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence.11 1 7
Brock v. Walton can be seen as a test case brought by the De-
partment of Labor to resolve the issue of union pension invest-
ments that create union jobs.118 Nevertheless, the court's decision
114. 609 F. Supp. 1221 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
115. See, e.g., Court Issues Strong Statement Supporting Prudence of Pension Fund Invest-
ment, LABOR & INVESTMENTS, June 1985, at 1, 6; Donovan v. Walton Opinion Provides Guide-
lines for Fiduciaries, PENSION WORLD, Oct. 1985, at 58-60; Union Investment Affirmed, PEN-
SIONS & INVESTMENT AGE, Mar. 18, 1985, at 2-3.
116. Originally, the Department of Labor [hereinafter "DOL" in notes] had also chal-
lenged the fund's sponsorship of a home mortgage loan program for plan participants and
its administrative service payments to union employees for "in kind" services performed as
violations of fiduciary duty. Earlier rulings by the Florida district court disposed of these
issues in the trustee's favor. Walton, 609 F. Supp. at 1225 & nn. 2 & 3; 10 PENS. REP'. (BNA)
No. 438, at 606 (Apr. 4, 1983). The DOL appealed the ruling on the mortgage loan pro-
gram to the court of appeals, but the district court view was upheld. The issue on appeal
was the DOL's contention that ERISA required the trustees to charge participants offered
mortgage loans a prevailing or market rate of interest. The court of appeals held that
section 406(a)(1)(B) of ERISA, requiring that a "reasonable rate of interest" be charged
participants for mortgage loans, should not be construed as requiring a prevailing or mar-
ket rate. The court noted that section 406(a)(1)(B) takes into account factors other than the
interest rate in determining whether such a loan is a prohibited transaction and found that
in cases where certain other safeguards are met that a "reasonable rate" could be below
the market rate. Brock v. Walton, No. 85-5641, slip op. (11th Cir. July 21, 1986).
117. Walton, 609 F. Supp. at 1238.
118. But cf. note 162 (positing several alternative reasons why the DOL might chal-
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neither ratifies nor strikes down this type of pension investing. It
is based mostly on a narrow analysis of the particular investment
made here under ERISA prudence standards. The impact of
ERISA's duty of loyalty on job-creating investments is largely ig-
nored. While this case is important because it permitted a union
job-creating investment, what may be more important is that the
court declined an opportunity in this case to decide this issue
under the duty of loyalty standards, where this analysis properly
belongs.n9
The facts of the case are as follows.1 20 In 1979, the Operating
Engineers Pension Trust Fund decided to purchase and develop
ninety-five acres of land in Broward'County, Florida as part of the
fund's overall investment policy of seeking to increase the fund's
capital returns through real estate. The fund also planned to fi-
nance the construction of several buildings on the site, with the
intention of landing Local 675 as the principal tenant of a new
office building. Even if this could not be accomplished, the fund
would proceed with the construction of the building, as indepen-
dent studies had shown that the rental market and projected capi-
tal return were very promising. The fund financed the project
completely .with its own funds rather than by acquiring construc-
tion loans. Land development and construction of the buildings
were the result of competitive bidding that was limited to compa-
nies whose workers were represented by Local 675. Under threat
of legal challenge from the Department of Labor, the project
commenced in 1981.
The Department of Labor filed suit against the trustees, chal-
lenging the real estate investment project on several grounds
under ERISA's fiduciary standards. They charged that the trust-
ees violated section 404(a)(1)(B)'s prudence rule by paying too
lenge job-creating investments by union pension fund trustees).
119. The court's use of the prudence rule over the duty of loyalty may be attributable
in part to the DOL's posture at trial. The DOL had focused on the duty of loyalty in its
unsuccessful challenge of the pension fund's home mortgage loan program. See supra note
116. Its focus on the prudence rule at trial concerning the real estate development project
may simply have been a change in strategy, and one which affected the court's written
opinion. Interview with Jayne E. Zanglein, Attorney-at-Law, Operating Engineers Local
675, Fringe Benefit Funds, in Buffalo, New York (Oct. 22, 1985). The court's failure to
deal sufficiently with the duty of loyalty may also explain why the DOL did not appeal the
ruling on the real estate project. Id.
120. Walton, 609 F. Supp. at 1226-27.
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much in construction costs, by not negotiating a high enough rent
from the union, by financing the project with equity capital rather
than debt, and by inaccurately projecting the rate of return on the
project.1 21 The Department also charged that the investment vio-
lated section 404(a)(1)(A)'s exclusive benefit rule by constructing
and leasing a building to the union for their benefit on terms not
beneficial to the participants.1 22 Finally, the Department alleged
that the fund's construction of the office building specifically for
the union violated section 406(b)'s prohibited transactions rule. 1 3
The court rejected each of the Department's claims. It based its
decision primarily on a strict prudence analysis of the investment.
Having decided that the prudence rule's requirements were met,
the court had little difficulty dismissing the allegations on other
grounds.
In finding that a prudent investment was made, Judge Gonza-
lez emphasized that the prudence rule requires analysis of the
methods used in making investment decisions, not the results
achieved. In so concentrating on the decision to invest, the
court found indicative of a course of prudent behavior such ac-
tions taken by the trustees as enlisting independent consultants to
research and advise on the viability of the investment, conducting
competitive bidding on the design and construction of the build-
ings, and retaining an independent real estate manager to negoti-
ate the union's lease with the fund. 25 In truth, the entire project
was meticulously conceived and executed by the trustees and inde-
pendent experts. All signs indicated nothing less than a "smashing
success." 1 26 The Department of Labor's charges of imprudence
based on individual aspects of the project which they claimed
raised its costs to the fund simply were not proven and could not
hold up against the court's broad view of what constitutes prudent
decision making.1 27
121. Id. at 1231-37.
122. Id. at 1244-45.
123. Id. at 1246.
124. "[O]ne must resist the knee jerk reflex to pronounce an investment prudent or
imprudent based on the success of the venture, for ERISA is concerned with the soundness
of the decision to invest." Id. at 1242.
125. Id. at 1240.
126. Id. at 1244.
127. "The DOL's difficulty stems from its perception of this case as much as its lack of
persuasive evidence. ... Id. at 1238.
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The opinion gave less play to ERISA duty of loyalty require-
ments than it did the prudence rule. 2 ' Adopting the collateral
benefit rule as it had been developed by the federal courts in re-
cent years, the court dismissed the Department's charge that the
union benefit from the investment caused a breach of fiduciary
duty. It ruled that: "ERISA section 404(a)(1)(A) simply does not
prohibit a party other than a plan's participants and beneficiaries
from benefiting in some measure from a prudent transaction with
the plan." 129 It cited a plethora of case law in support of this
view.13 0
The court acknowledged that the union did derive a benefit
from the lease of the office building and the increase in job oppor-
tunities for its members. Consistent with the collateral benefit
rule, it noted that secondary benefits are not precluded by ERISA
where they are incidental to the primary benefit to the fund. 131
Though it noted the rule, the court failed to make the crucial
analysis of trustee motivation that the collateral benefit rule re-
quires. It did not address what constitutes primary versus inciden-
tal benefit, nor did it attempt to make a finding of either on the
facts before it.
Finally, the court made short work of the claim that the in-
vestment violated ERISA's prohibited transactions rule because it
involved a party in interest. The Department of Labor did not
contend that the construction loans to the independent contrac-
tors organized by the union were prohibited transactions because
the contractors or the union were parties in interest. These trans-
actions were exempted from the rule because they were qualified
128. The opinion does not use the phrase "duty of loyalty," but its analysis of ERISA
§ 404(a)(1) applies the statutory language and case law from which this phrase is derived.
Cf note 82 (DOL has not taken position that socially or union motivated investments pre-
sent per se violation of prudence rule).
129. Walton, 609 F. Supp. at 1245.
130. This being a case of first impression in the 11 th Circuit, the court drew for sup-
port from case law from other circuits. The opinion discussed Leigh v. Engle, 727 F.2d
113 (7th Cir. 1983); Donovan v. Bierwith, 680 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied 459
U.S. 1069 (1982); Morse v. Stanley, 566 F. Supp. 1455 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), affd in part rev'd
on other grounds 732 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1984). Donovan v. Dougherty, 550 F. Supp. 390
(S.D. Ala. 1982); Brink v. DaLesio, 496 F. Supp. 1350 (D. Md. 1980), affd in part rev'd on
other grounds 667 F.2d 420 (4th Cir. 1981). Walton, 609 F. Supp. at 1245-46.
131. "[A] trustee may make management decisions that incidentally benefit the plan
or the trustees provided the judgment is prudent and primarily promotes the interest of
plan participants and beneficiaries." Walton, 609 F. Supp. at 1245.
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construction loans.132 The Department contended, rather, that
the fund violated the prohibited transactions rule by constructing
an office building for use by the union, a transaction with a party
in interest. 3 3 The issue was resolved by the court simply by giving
a broad construction to two other exemptions to the rule which
permit multiemployer plans to lease office space to the sponsoring
employee organization when certain conditions are met.'
B. The Decision Analyzed
Brock v. Walton stands for the proposition that union pension
investments that create jobs for the members of the union may be
made so long as they satisfy ERISA. prudence requirements and
are exempted from the prohibited transactions rule. In other
words, this case could be taken to mean that, as a matter of law,
union job-creating investments do not constitute a per se violation
of the ERISA duty of loyalty. Such a holding would represent a
bold step in the interpretation of ERISA fiduciary standards, were
it expressly taken. Because it was not, the Florida district court
has missed an excellent opportunity to set significant precedent by
giving definition to the collateral benefit rule of the duty of loy-
alty in cases involving union job-creating pension investments.
The district court relied on its own watered-down version of
the collateral benefit rule to find that this investment satisfied the
trustees' duty of loyalty. Employment of the rule to approve of
secondary benefits from investments is typically premised on a
finding that those benefits are incidental to the primary benefit to
the fund. 135 Though it acknowledged this, the court applied a
much different test under the auspices of the collateral benefit
rule. It held that benefits derived by the union do not violate the
duty of loyalty where they are "parallel and inseparable from the
132. The loans qualified for exemption from the prohibited transactions rule under
41 Fed. Reg. 12,740, 12,744-45 (1976) (Prohibited Transaction Exemption 76-1).
133. Walton, 609 F. Supp. at 1246.
134. 41 Fed. Reg. 12,740, 12,744-45 (1976) (Prohibited Transaction Exemption 76-
1); 42 Fed. Reg. 33,918 (1977) (Prohibited Transaction Exemption 77-10). The main con-
ditions these provisions require for exemption are that the plan receive reasonable com-
pensation for the lease, that the plan be able to terminate the relationship on reasonably
short notice, and that the plan maintain the necessary records so that the DOL can verify
compliance. See Walton, 609 F. Supp. at 1247.
135. See supra notes 98-113 and accompanying text.
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benefits derived for the fund and its participants. '" 136 Such a test
blatantly ignores the issue of the trustees' motivation in making
the investment decision-the investment's "primary purpose."
This issue is the foundational element upon which the collateral
benefit rule relies.1"' Because this was a case of first impression in
the eleventh circuit, the court was of course not bound by any set
interpretation of the duty of loyalty. By applying a new set of
rules without clearly enunciating or supporting them, however,
the court limited its decision's importance and left itself open for
reversal.
Perhaps the court ignored the issue of motivation because it
presented such a difficult problem in this case. If a motivation-
based test were used, and an improper primary motivation found,
the court would be forced to strike down, based on a strict legal-
ism, what it otherwise had found to be a perfectly prudent and
profitable investment.
The question in this case of what was the primary purpose of
the investment was a vexing one. Because of the prudence of this
investment, it was clear to the court that the trustees were moti-
vated, at least in part, by a desire to serve the financial interests of
the fund. It was also clear, though, that the trustees gave a great
deal of consideration to the benefits that the union and its mem-
bers would receive. In such a case, how should a court determine
primary purpose? The courts have stated that they will look at all
of the circumstantial evidence and attempt to draw reasonable in-
ferences.138 One factor that leads to a finding that the collateral
benefit was the primary purpose is intentional financial sacri-
fice.13" A financial sacrifice was made by the trustees of Local
675's pension fund when they decided that the main building of
the development project would be constructed by a building con-
tractor who employed Local 675 members. The court recognized
that this decision raised the cost of the project over what it would
have been had the trustees decided to use nonunion labor 140 and,
yet, it overlooked its impact on the duty of loyalty rule. This is not
to suggest that the court should have held that the trustees vio-
136. Walton, 609 F. Supp. at 1245.
137. See supra notes 98-113 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
140. Walton, 609 F. Supp. at 1234.
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lated their duty simply because they chose to use union rather
than nonunion labor. Union labor may not result in extra expense
in every case. Indeed, some would argue that the use of higher-
cost union labor does not pose a sacrifice for the value of the in-
vestment to the fund, but adds to its value because the higher
wage costs are outweighed by the additional quality that union la-
bor brings to the finished product."" This does suggest that the
proper analysis of investments predicated on the guaranteed use
of union labor raises more serious questions under the collateral
benefit rule than are dealt with in Walton.
A clearer statement of ERISA fiduciary requirements for
union job-creating investments must be made. Interpretation of
both the prudence and duty of loyalty rules over the past several
years has evolved to allow collateral benefit investments that are
primarily motivated by a desire to serve the financial interest of
the fund. Investments that create union jobs push at the limits
of this interpretation because they impose costs on the pension
fund that call into question their primary motivation. A discussion
of the genesis of the issue of job-creating investments in the build-
ing and construction trades unions will point out its importance,
and highlight the arguments for and against sanctioning these in-
vestments under ERISA.
VI. THE "UNION-LABOR" ISSUE
A. The Parties to the Issue and Their Positions
Building and construction trades unions have seized the initia-
tive on the union strategy of using pension fund assets to finance
increased job opportunities for members. Investments in real es-
tate development projects are being made on the guarantee that
only union members will perform the work created by the invest-
ment. Though most of these investments have proceeded without
challenge, a serious question as to their legality remains. Put sim-
ply, is a union labor guarantee permissible under ERISA? The
eventual resolution of the "union-labor" issue is critical to the fu-
141. Interview with Jayne E. Zanglein, supra note 119.
142. See supra notes 74-113 and accompanying text. But ef. Lynn, Investing Pension
Funds for Social Goals Requires Changing the Law, 53 U. CoLo. L. REv. 101 (1981) (arguing
that current ERISA fiduciary rules are not sufficient to accommodate "social" benefit
investments).
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ture of pension investing as a strategy to promote unionism. For
the parties currently embroiled in this controversy, the stakes are
very high.
1. The Construction Unions. Predicating union pension invest-
ments on the guaranteed use of union labor is a strategy for sur-
vival among building and construction trades unions. The per-
centage of union-built commercial construction has declined from
about 80% in the 1960's to as low as 40% in recent years, causing
membership in these unions to decline.143 By using their pension
funds to create jobs for union members, construction unions have
begun to fully exploit the degree of control that they have over
their pension plans. This is due to the fact that most construction
union pension plans are of the jointly administered, multiem-
ployer variety.144 Union trustees have given new direction to the
investment policy of these pension funds by playing a more active
role in investment decision making. The movement of pension as-
sets of construction union funds into job-creating projects has
been significant, 145 and though estimates are not available, it is
clear that these projects have created an equally significant num-
ber of union jobs. This fact alone has increased the attractiveness
of union membership among workers in the construction indus-
try. The future viability of construction unions may indeed de-
pend on the continued legality of job-creating pension
investments.
2. Participants and Beneficiaries. Participants and beneficiaries
of pension plans, those whose sole interest and exclusive benefit is
protected by ERISA, actually have the least to say about pension
investment decisions. The Supreme Court has made clear in
Daniel v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters that workers do not
have a remedy under federal law for complaints about the man-
agement of their pension funds assets. 46 Where workers are or-
ganized in a union, however, it can hardly be said that they lack
the means to control pension asset management. The distinction
is that they cannot do so individually, but they can do so collec-
tively by ratifying union contracts that create and regulate pen-
sion funds, as well as by electing the union officers who sit on the
143. H. GRAY, supra note 4, at 41.
144. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
146. 439 U.S. 551 (1980).
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board of trustees of jointly administered funds.147 In this respect,
labor unions can be seen as the agents for connecting participant
ownership of fund assets with participant control. Resolution of
the union-labor issue is necessary to define the extent to which
this control can be used to promote the participant interests of
increased employment opportunities and retirement security.
Participant members of construction unions have strongly
supported the efforts of their leadership to use their pension as-
sets to finance job opportunities; more work means not only a
steadier living wage, it also means a greater likelihood for workers
of vesting and eventually receiving a pension.1 48 Retired members
and other beneficiaries collecting union pensions have also been
supportive; more work for current participants also helps ensure
the stability of the fund by increasing employer contributions to
it. 49 Moreover, equity real estate investments have proved to be
profitable, low risk investments in recent years, 50 which also en-
sures the health of the fund.
3. Employers. Initially, the corporate community was un-
receptive to the idea of union job creation and other "social in-
vestments."' 151 Pension trustees had learned from institutional in-
vestors to think only in terms of conventional asset management,
which permits investing for no other reason than to maximize re-
turns. The diminished resistance among employers can be attrib-
uted to two main developments. First, the courts have interpreted
ERISA fiduciary requirements to be flexible enough to permit at
least some consideration of collateral benefits from investment.1 52
The potential personal liability of fiduciaries for the large sums of
money that may be lost by bad investments 5 is a strong deterrent
for taking chances on ERISA. Second, like the unions, many em-
ployers have realized the benefits that job-creating investments in
147. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
148. See infra note 174 and accompanying text.
149. See infra note 175 and accompanying text.
150. See generally D. Walton, ERISA, Solely In Whose Interest? 21-24 (unpublished
paper presented at Florida International University, Mar. 1983). Pension fund investments
in real estate continue to increase. In 1985, pension funds in the United States invested $6
billion in real estate, bringing their total collective holdings to over $40 billion. Wall St. J.,
Apr. 1, 1986, at 1, col. 6.
151. See H. GRAY, supra note 4, at 47-51.
152. See supra notes 63-113 and accompanying text.
153. See H. GRAY, supra note 4, at 51.
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their business can bring. 1 5  They, too, have been the victim of
traditional investment policy that ignores the positive collateral
impact that pension investments can have on business.
Some of the stiffest opposition to guaranteed union labor in-
vestments in the construction industry has come from a different
group of employers, however. These are the nonunion construc-
tion contractors who lose business when real estate projects are
developed with union-labor guarantees. Because these contractors
do not have standing to bring a civil action for breach of fiduciary
duty under ERISA, 15 5 opposition has come in the form of claims
against union funds under section 1 of the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act156 for restraint of trade. This form of opposition has not been
successful. The Department of Justice concluded in June, 1984
that it would not consider a Cincinnati area building trades invest-
ment foundation to be in restraint of trade because it loaned
money only to union developers and contractors.1 57 Similarly, a
district court in California in January, 1985 dismissed an anti-trust
suit brought by a nonunion contractor against a union pension
fund making "union only" construction loans. 58 Opposition
among nonunion employers is not organized. They do have a
strong ally, though, in the Department of Labor.
4. Department of Labor. The Department of Labor's concern
about union job-creating investments is not apparent. Even its po-
sition on the permissability of such investments under ERISA fi-
duciary requirements is not clear, though its actions in recent
years would seem to indicate that it is negative. 59
Equally unclear is the Department of Labor's position on the
union-labor issue. With the exception of the Walton case, where
the labor costs challenge was merely one among many,160 the De-
partment of Labor has not raised this union-labor issue in lawsuits
154. Id.
155. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 432(a), 29 U.S.C, §
1132(a) (1982).
156. The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
157. See LABOR & INVESTMENTS, Sept. 1984, at 1.
158. Beutler Sheetmetal v. McMorgan & Co., 616 F. Supp. 453 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
159. Aside from bringing union pension fund trustees to court over job-creating in-
vestments, the DOL has used the threat of legal action to cause union trustees to back away
from planned investment projects. See, e.g., 12 PENS. REP. (BNA) No. 2, at 86 (jan. 14,
1985). Meanwhile, however, certain other projects have proceeded unchallenged. See, e.g.,
LABOR & INVESTMENTS, Nov. 1983, at 3.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 121-23.
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brought against union funds making job-creating investments. 1"
It is possible that the Department of Labor raised the issue in Wal-
ton simply as one of a host of alternative challenges to the invest-
ment to see which, if any, the court would recognize. It is also
possible that the Department of Labor has realized the pivotal
role that the union-labor issue plays in determining the legality of
job-creating investments. If so, we are likely to see more direct
challenges from the Department of Labor of these investments
where increased labor costs is a result. Given the unsettled nature
of the ERISA duty of loyalty and its collateral benefit rule after
Walton, such a legal argument remains plausible. Regardless, it is
still hard to imagine why the Department of Labor should con-
tinue to challenge investments such as were made in Walton. One
can only speculate about the reasons why it would challenge pru-
dent, profitable, low risk, job-creating investments based on an ar-
guably weak duty of loyalty theory." 2
161. See, e.g., Marshall v. Glass/Metal Assoc. & Glaziers & Glassworkers Pension Plan,
507 F. Supp. 378 (D. Hawaii 1980); Donovan v. Retirement Fund Trust of the Plumbing,
Heating and Piping Industry of S. California (Civil Action No. 84-9967 AHS (Bx), Jan. 4,
1985) (reported in 12 PENS. REP. (BNA) No. 2, at 86 (Jan. 14, 1985)); 12 PENs. REP. (BNA)
No. 4, at 152 (Jan. 28, 1985)).
162. There are several possibilities. One is that the DOL has no particular disagree-
ment with job-creating investments, so long as they are prudent, and that the Walton case
should be viewed as an aberration, brought by the DOL for reasons not so enforcement-
minded. Observers of that case claim that it may have been brought because of certain
animosities that officials at the DOL held for the outspoken Dennis Walton, president and
pension fund trustee of Local 675. Interview with Jayne E. Zanglein, supra note 119.
It is also possible that the DOL is sensitive to what they may feel is the increased risk
involved when a pension fund breaks from traditional investing in favor of a program for
job-creating investments, an area of still largely uncharted territory. As the enforcement
agent of ERISA fiduciary standards, the DOL is responsible for seeing that pension plans
do not invest imprudently and raise the risk of plan termination, which is against the finan-
cial interest of participants and beneficiaries, employers, and the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation, which insures pension plan termination. See generally The Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act of 1974, §§ 4061-4068, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1368 (1982) (single-
employer liability); Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, §§ 1-24, 29
U.S.C. §§ 1381-1405 (1982) (multiemployer liability); The Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974, §§ 4001-4009, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1309 (1982) (Pension Benefit Guar-
antee Corporation).
Still another possibility is the DOL's alleged anti-union bias under President Reagan. In
1982, the DOL contracted with the anti-union National Right to Work Committee for a
study of pension fund investments that create jobs for participants. Not surprisingly, the
study condemned all plan investments in job-creating projects as inherently imprudent and
contrary to the interests of the participants. Under pressure from the AFL-CIO, the DOL
decided not to release the study. See LABOR & INVESTMENTS, June 1983, at 3-5. Commenta-
tors have also noted that the DOL under Reagan has shown extreme anti-union animus in
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B. Possible Legal Resolutions of the "Union-Labor" Issue
The legal resolution of the union-labor issue must come from
the federal courts. The Department of Labor has taken the posi-
tion that it will not exercise its power to issue agency regulations
to govern "social investment" questions and instead will leave the
fate of these investments to the courts.1 1 3 There are also no indi-
cations that ERISA fiduciary requirements will be amended by
Congress to make a clearer accommodation for job-creating
investments. 6
Brock v. Walton can be seen as a missed opportunity to reach a
resolution of the union-labor issue. It is especially unfortunate
that the decision did not focus on this issue because the facts of
the case were such a perfect invitation to do so. 65 The union-
labor issue can be expected to arise again, and when it does, a
trier of fact may make one of several possible determinations.
One possibility is to continue along the lines of Walton. That
is, to disregard the importance of the union-labor issue. This ra-
tionale would permit job-creating investments so long as they are
prudent, ignoring the implications of ERISA's duty of loyalty.
While this alternative may be acceptable to organized labor be-
cause it achieves its ends, it should not be argued by union liti-
gators because it is destined to be short-lived. As the above analy-
sis suggests, the Walton result is a misapplication of ERISA
fiduciary requirements.166 This decision is as likely to be ignored
as it is to be accorded any weight by future courts looking at this
issue.
Another possibility is to outlaw union job-creating invest-
ments based on a strict interpretation of the duty of loyalty rule.
This is the position apparently taken by the Department of La-
bor16 7 and other opponents of this type of investing.16  They ar-
gue that an investment predicated on union job creation will nec-
areas of enforcement other than for pension plans. See D. ELBAOR & L. GOLD, DOES UNCLE
SAM LooK OR AIM FOR THE UNION LABEL? (1985).
163. 11 PENS. REP. (BNA) No. 19, at 613 (May 7, 1984).
164. Lynn, supra note 142, makes the argument that such an amendment is necessary
to accommodate these investments.
165. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 135-42 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 159-62 and accompanying text.
168. See Langbein & Posner, supra note 81, at 96-104.
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essarily violate the duty of loyalty because it puts the interests of
the union ahead of those of the fund. This, they argue, is beyond
the scope of acceptable investments under the collateral benefit
rule to the duty of loyalty.' The fact that the fund has made
financial sacrifices to accommodate the collateral union benefit, by
way of the higher costs of investing in union as opposed to non-
union construction, for example, is evidence that the union bene-
fit is the primary purpose of the investment. Such an argument,
while admittedly consistent with the current interpretation of the
collateral benefit rule,'17 0 should no longer be seriously enter-
tained because it actually contravenes the central purpose of
ERISA which is, as the name of the Act itself suggests, to promote
"employee retirement income security."''1  This purpose is not
served by a rule that discourages pension fund trustees from fi-
nancing the employment of its own participants and encourages
them to finance the employment of other workers, sometimes
even those who compete against participants for work in the same
industries. This interpretation of the duty of loyalty has been criti-
cized as being premised on "myopic legalisms"' 1 2 and evidencing
"tunnel vision' '1 73 on the part of the Department of Labor. In-
deed, such an analysis ignores the fact that every pension invest-
ment has potential secondary impacts on a fund beyond simply the
profits or losses that it returns.
The final possibility is that the federal courts will ratify union
job-creating investments by expanding the present interpretation
of the ERISA duty of loyalty. Under an expanded interpretation,
the collateral benefit rule would come to mean that investments
which are designed to confer benefits on a collateral interest, so
long as they can pass muster under ERISA's prohibited transac-
tions and prudence rules, do not violate the duty of loyalty simply
because they earn less direct return than non-collateral benefit in-
vestments. The foundational element of the collateral benefit
rule, the primary purpose analysis, would open up to accept proof
169. Id.
170. See supra notes 98-113 and accompanying text.
171. See The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, §2, 29 U.S.C. § 1001
(1982) (congressional findings and declaration of policy).
172. Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Second Motion For Partial Summary
Judgment at 33, Brock v. Walton, 609 F. Supp. 1221 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
173. S. FLA. Bus. J., Apr. 1-7, 1985, at 33 (quote of Dennis Walton).
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of a purpose to benefit the retirement security interest of partici-
pants and beneficiaries in ways other than through investment re-
turn, such as through job creation. Job creation promotes this in-
terest by raising the likelihood of participant vesting 174 and by
adding to the amount of contributions to the fund. 17 5
This interpretation of the duty of loyalty would involve
broadening the definitions of "solely in the interest" and "exclu-
sive benefit" in the statute to include all significant interests and
benefits that heed ERISA's mandate to protect retirement income
security. This construction of the duty of loyalty takes the collat-
eral benefit rule a step further, beyond where it was left after
ERISA cases such as Beirwith,17 6 and closer to an analysis such as
was suggested under state law in Withers.177 Essentially, this new
interpretation would reject the notion that the duty of loyalty
should create a per se rule against higher cost union job-creating
investments. Nor would it create a per se rule in the opposite di-
rection-that all job-creating investments satisfy the duty because
of the mere possibility that they indirectly benefit the retirement
interests of participants and beneficiaries. Furthermore, it would
not permit taking into account, for the purpose of satisfying the
duty of loyalty, those collateral benefits that, though they may be
laudable, cannot be directly related to improving retirement in-
come security.
174. ERISA authorizes three types of vesting formulas for pension plans: 10 year
"cliff" vesting, 5 to 15 year "graduated" vesting, and vesting under "the rule of 45." See
D. McGiIL, supra note 49, at 140-43 for an explanation of these formulas. Under each, the
years of service of the participant is determinative of nonforfeitability. For the latter two,
the years of service will also affect the amount of the benefit received.
175. The financial strength of a pension fund derives from the amount of contribu-
tions to it as well as it does from the return on its investments. There are two main types of
pension funding arrangements. In a "defined contribution" plan, employee and/or em-
ployer contributions to the fund are based on time worked and are paid into individual
employee accounts. In a "defined benefit" plan, employer contributions are based on actu-
arial projections that determine the current funding necessary to meet the future liability
of the fund to pay benefit levels which are fixed for vested participants. See D. McGILL,
supra note 49, at 89-111 for a discussion of defined benefit and defined contribution plans.
Increased work for participants raises the level of contributions to the fund, directly for
a defined contribution plan, and indirectly for defined benefit plans through the effect of
increased expectation of participant vesting on actuarial projections. Increasing the asset
pool of a pension fund may raise the quality of the investments that the fund can make,
thus strengthening the fund for the benefit of participants and beneficiaries.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 98-99.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 95-97.
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Analysis of the primary purpose of collateral benefit invest-
ments would remain fact oriented, with fulfillment of the fiduciary
requirement for loyalty determined on a case-by-case basis. In
other words, a trier of fact would need to determine in each case
whether or not the projected sacrifice to the fund (through in-
creased labor costs, for example) is outweighed by the potential
for benefits returned to the fund from the collateral interest pro-
moted. The benefits accruing from an investment would be mea-
sured by adding to the projected direct financial return such other
factors related to retirement security as the greater likelihood of
participant vesting and the increase of employer contributions to
the fund.""8 This balancing of the dual purposes of an investment
would more accurately discern its "primary purpose" and, thus,
determine whether the duty of loyalty is satisfied.
Perhaps the courts are reluctant to expand the duty of loyalty
in this manner because they see a difficulty in limiting it. If the
trustees are permitted to satisfy their fiduciary obligations by mak-
ing investments that benefit the fund through the indirect impacts
of a collateral interest, how broad a view of indirect impacts
should be taken? Are investments in other areas of the regional
economy permissible because they may eventually result in in-
creased business to the employer and thus more jobs? These types
of questions will, admittedly, be difficult ones to answer under this
new approach, but not ones which the courts cannot resolve by
making "reasonable inferences" from "circumstantial evi-
dence. 17' These are questions of fact for the court to resolve in
deciding whether or not the trustees have made the interests of
the fund their primary concern. As has always been the case
under the collateral benefit rule, the courts will analyze the bene-
ficial impact of an investment by measuring its financial return.
This new approach simply redefines the way in which financial re-
turn is measured by looking for indirect as well as direct return.
Perhaps the courts are also reluctant to adopt this broader
view of the duty of loyalty because they fear that it will disturb the
current interpretation of the prudence rule. Because it would now
be permissible for return from collateral benefits to enter into the
178. See supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
179. Davidson v. Cook, 567 F. Supp. 225, 236 (E.D. Va. 1983); See supra note 105 and
accompanying text.
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equation for trustees assessing investment alternatives, would a
failure to take it into account be a violation of the prudence rule?
Though an affirmative answer would seem to turn the prudence
rule on its head, the plain language of the statute does seem to
lead to this conclusion. ERISA requires that a fiduciary act as a
"prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such mat-
ters."180 Under the current interpretation of the rule, many in-
vestments have been permitted that served to the detriment of
fund participants. For union pension funds, examples are invest-
ments in the securities of corporations that produce overseas or
that are in direct competition with the enterprise employing the
participant.181 Moreover, the current prudence rule gives no
favorable consideration to investments that promote the retire-
ment income security of participants through creating job oppor-
tunities for them; the rule has only been stretched so far as to
tolerate such investments in some cases." 2 To be true to the pru-
dence rule, the courts must recognize that a prudent man in a
union pension fund trustee "capacity" and "familiar with such
matters" as pertain to union workers would, and must, act to
avoid those investments that may take jobs away from participants
and promote instead those investments that will create jobs.
VII. CONCLUSION
Within union pension funds lies a largely untapped resource
which unions would like to use to restore strength to their move-
ment. Directed union investment of pension funds can create jobs
for union members, help sustain local and regional economies
where unions are strong, and discourage employers from engag-
ing in anti-union activities. The battle that needs to be fought
before this occurs is over the control of pension fund assets
through union negotiation of jointly administered plans.
Unions in the building and construction trades industries,
most of which already manage jointly administered pension plans,
have charted a course in job-creating pension investment for
other unions to follow. The legality of these investments under
180. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1104(a)(1)(B) (1982).
181. See supra text accompanying note 1.
182. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
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ERISA fiduciary requirements is not yet clear. By predicating
their investments on the guaranteed use of union labor in the
work that the investment generates, union funds are in danger of
violating the duty of loyalty requirement for fiduciaries. The re-
cent federal district court decision in Brock *v. Walton, though it
has been celebrated by labor for the fact that it permitted a con-
struction union job-creating investment, serves more to confuse
the debate over the duty of loyalty than it does to focus it.
A clearer resolution by the federal courts of the "union-la-
bor" issue is necessary, for there is much at stake for the parties
to this controversy. Several resolutions are possible, but only one
is consistent with the central purpose of ERISA to promote the
retirement income security of pension participants and benefi-
ciaries. Judicial interpretation of the duty of loyalty should be
broadened to take into account the indirect benefits to retirement
security that union job-creating investments bring. ERISA fiduci-
ary standards must be interpreted to require pension plan trustees
to take into account the actual impacts that pension fund invest-
ments have on employers, unions, workers, and retirees.
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